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Abstract 
Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically 
predisposed to cast their vote in favor of one political party, they may reelect an 
underperforming incumbent. Party polarization may augment this effect since the median 
voter faces a higher cost of selecting a better, but ideologically distant incumbent. 
Alternatively, if the electorate is evenly divided between parties, polarization may induce 
parties to apply greater effort to improve their election prospects.  
The current paper analyzes efficiency in Norwegian local government. Efficiency has been 
measured by means of panel data on government service output over a ten-year period. 
Electoral dominance has been measured as number of elections where one party bloc receives 
at least 60 percent of the votes, measured over six consecutive elections. Party polarization is 
defined as the ideological distance between the two party blocs, and it is measured on basis of 
survey data on the ideological preferences of elected politicians. Lack of party competition 
reduces cost efficiency, the effect being stronger in governments where party polarization is 
large. These agency losses are greater in high-revenue municipalities. 
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1. Introduction 
A large theoretical literature suggests that democratic competition improves government 
performance. Voters will oust the incumbent from office if he fails to provide public services 
efficiently. This contrasts with a situation in which one political party holds a near-monopoly 
position, and therefore expects to be reelected irrespective of performance. However, this 
assumes a considerable degree of party polarization. The voters face low costs of ousting an 
underperforming incumbent when the competing parties are ideologically close.1 A majority 
of the citizens will cast their votes for an incompetent party only when alternatives are 
ideologically distant. This does not necessarily mean that party polarization always impedes 
government performance. When the electorate is evenly split between the contenders, 
polarization does not deter voters from selecting the best party as officeholder. When party 
leaders are policy oriented, they have an incentive to deliver better performance when the 
opponent is ideologically distant. Therefore, a stiff competition is always valuable, but 
polarization can both be beneficial or harmful. 
A relatively small empirical literature addresses the effects of democratic competition. Part of 
this literature relies on indirect indicators of economic performance or rent-taking, such as 
economic growth (Keefer and Knack 2002; Pinto and Timmons 2005; Persson and Tabellini 
2005; Besley et.al. 2010), levels of taxation and worker compensation (Besley and Case 2003), 
financial support to political parties and politicians’ wage level (Svaleryd and Vlachos 2009), 
infant mortality (Svensson 2005), and various indicators of political corruption (Testa 2007; 
Brown et.al. 2011). A few studies use more direct indicators of government performance, 
typically data on local government efficiency. Studies on English and Flemish local 
authorities suggest that an intensive party competition improves government performance 
(Boyne et.al 2012; Ashworth et. al 2008). Neither these nor other existing empirical studies 
address the combined impact of electoral dominance and polarization on government 
performance.2   
                                                          
1Ideology may also refer to ethnic, racial, religious divisions in society; cf. Easterly and Levine (1997) and 
Alesina et.al (1999). 
2Other studies have addressed local government performance, including Borge and Naper (2006), Borge et.al. 
(2008), Bruns and Himmler (2011), Geys et.al (2010), Hauner (2008), Padovano and Ricciuti (2009), and 
Petterson-Lidbom (2006). These studies do not analyze the impact of party competition on government 
performance. 
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The current analysis is based on Norwegian local government data.3 Public service output has 
been measured over a ten-year period and data covers more than 400 local authorities. 
Electoral dominance has been measured as the extent to which one of the party blocs has held 
a dominant position in the electorate for up to six election periods before the relevant ten-year 
period. Survey data has been used to measure the ideological preferences of individual 
council members in 120 municipalities in two election periods. These data has been used to 
measure the ideological polarization. The analyses suggest that a lopsided electorate is 
detrimental to government performance, and that it can be especially harmful if party 
polarization is large.  
We start by outlining the theoretical argument. The ensuing sections present the institutional 
setting and data sources; we outline measurement issues, and discuss the identification 
strategy. Finally, we present the panel data regressions that estimate the impact of party 
polarization on the cost efficiency of local government.  
 
2. The impact of electoral dominance and party polarization 
Electoral agency models address voters’ capacity to minimize rent extraction by their elected 
leaders, and to induce politicians to work hard for the benefit the citizenry. Political 
competition is the key mechanism for disciplining the representatives. The democratic market 
can fail when one contender has a near-monopoly position. We address situations where one 
political party enjoys a dominant situation as consequence of voters’ ideological preferences.  
Some theoretical contributions explore models where the so-called valence dimension (such 
as government efficiency) is fixed, and the ideological dimension is endogenous. For example, 
Groseclose (2001) develops a model where polarization weakens incentives to invest in 
valence. He suggests that the party (or candidate) with an advantage on the valence dimension 
moves towards the ideological center; the disadvantaged party moves away from the center. 
Other models assume that both dimensions are endogenous. Based on such models, Ashworth 
and Mesquita (2008) propose that party polarization causes a reduction in parties’ incentives 
                                                          
3Ideological polarization has increased in many national legislatures. In the U.S. case, the ideological distance 
between the Republican and Democrat parties has widened. For example, party polarization has grown 
considerably as measured by representatives’ voting patterns in Congress (McCarthy et.al. 2006, table 1.1). 
Ideological distances between political parties have also increased in many European countries. Analyses 
addressing the European setting (based on data from the Manifesto project) suggest that parties take more 
divergent ideological positions (Schneider 2004). 
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to invest in valence. On the other hand, Serra (2010) and Van Weelden (2013a; 2013b) 
discuss models where higher levels of party polarization benefits the citizenry, usually subject 
to an ideologically balanced electorate. 
As basis for empirical work, the current framework assumes that political parties have fixed 
ideological positions. The parties seek political office to implement their preferred policies 
(Wittman 1983; Calvert 1985), and the incumbent party therefore implements its preferred 
ideological policy. One reason for fixed positions could be that the ideological program is 
defined at national party conventions, and is binding for the local party groups. Another is that 
party representatives adhere to particular ideological belief systems, and election promises 
that deviate from underlying preferences are not credible (Alesina 1988; Persson and 
Tabellini 2000:99–101).  
These modeling assumptions imply a low degree of contestability. A third party cannot enter 
the political arena due to high barriers to entry. If barriers to entry were low, an 
underperforming political party could be replaced with a new party with a similar ideological 
position (see for example, Wittman 1989). Similarly, intra-party competition could be a 
substitute for contestability. ‘Internal takeovers’ would imply that rival candidates could 
challenge and replace the less competent or hard-working party leaders. The above 
assumptions also imply that competition is hampered by ideological rigidity. One might 
imagine situations where the political parties shift their ideological positions to compensate 
lack of competence and policy performance (Groseclose 2001).  
The selection hypothesis 
Citizens can control their leaders either by means of selection (electing ‘good’ politicians) or 
by means of incentives (reelecting politicians who produce satisfactory policy outcomes). The 
selection mechanism is simple. Consider two political parties A and B with fixed ideal points 
on an ideological axis (y). The ideological stance of Party A is −𝑥
2
, and of party B 𝑥
2
 . The 
incumbent party can exert effort (𝑒), while the opposition party exerts no effort. The 
preferences of voter i is described by an ideal point 𝑣𝑖 on the ideological axis (y). We define 
the voter’s utility function: 𝑉 = −(𝑦𝑃 − 𝑣𝑖)2 + 𝑒𝑃, where 𝑦𝑃 = −𝑥2 , 𝑥2 and P = A, P. The voter 
benefits from incumbency effort and she dislikes ideological policies that deviate from her 
bliss point.  
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Party effort is fixed by competence. Therefore, the voter casts her vote for party A if −(−𝑥
2
−
𝑣𝑖)2 + 𝑒𝐴 ≥ −(𝑥2 − 𝑣𝑖)2 + 𝑒𝐵. This means that 𝑒𝐴 − 𝑒𝐵 ≥ 2𝑥𝑣𝑖. Similar to Besley et.al. 
(2010), lack of competition is defined by electoral dominance. Suppose voter i is the decisive 
median voter (i=m), and that her ideological position is closer to party B than party A 
(𝑣𝑚 > 0). This means that the median voter faces a higher ideological cost of ousting a 
(potentially) incompetent party B when the decisive voter has a strong ideological 
commitment and party polarization is high. The selection hypothesis suggests that higher 
levels of electoral dominance and party polarization to lead to lower performance. 
The incentive hypothesis 
The incentive hypothesis can be derived from a probabilistic voting model (Polo 1998; 
Persson and Tabellini 2000:91-91). Since effort is costly to the elected leaders4, the utility 
functions of the political parties can be defined as follows:   𝑈𝐴 = −(𝑦 + 𝑥2)2 − 𝑒𝐴 and 
𝑈𝐵 = −(𝑦 − 𝑥2)2 − 𝑒𝐵. Higher levels of effort are assumed to yield a positive social gain since 
the effort costs are very small relative to the benefits of a large citizenry.    
The distribution of voters is described by a simple uniform distribution on  [− 1
2𝜃
+ 𝑣𝑚, 12𝜃 +
𝑣𝑚] where 𝑣𝑚 is the ideal point of the median voter. Again the positive dominance implies a 
median voter bliss point closer to party B (𝑣𝑚 > 0). The share of votes in favor of party A is 
𝑃𝐴 = 12 − 𝜃𝑣𝑚 + 𝜃 𝑒𝐴−𝑒𝐵2𝑥 . The median position is subject to random popularity shocks. 
Suppose 𝑣𝑚 = 𝑣�𝑚 + 𝜀 where 𝑣�𝑚 is the expected position and 𝜀 is uniformly distributed on [− 1
2𝜑
, 1
2𝜑
]. The probability of party A getting a majority of votes is: 𝜋𝐴 = Pr �𝑃𝐴 > 12� =Pr �1
2
− 𝜃(𝑣�𝑚 + 𝜀) + 𝜃 𝑒𝐴−𝑒𝐵2𝑥 > 12� = 12 − 𝜑𝑣�𝑚 + 𝜑 𝑒𝐴−𝑒𝐵2𝑥 .  
The parties maximize expected utility with respect to effort, given the effort level offered by 
the opponent. The first-order conditions yield equilibrium effort levels and winning 
probabilities5 and define the expected effort level: 𝐸(𝑒𝐴) + 𝐸(𝑒𝐵)=𝑥2 − [23 𝑥𝑣�𝑚]2 − 𝑥𝜑. 
                                                          
4Similar models have been suggested in the corporate governance literature. For example, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) analyze the impact of antitakeover laws. When firms are insulated from takeovers, 
managers prefer “to enjoy the quit life”.   
5Equilibrium effort levels are: 𝑒𝐴 = 23 𝑥𝑣�𝑚 − 𝑥𝜑 + 𝑥2 and 𝑒𝐵 = −23 𝑥𝑣�𝑚 − 𝑥𝜑 + 𝑥2. The equilibrium probability 
that party A wins the election is: 𝜋𝐴(= 1 − 𝜋𝐵) = 12 − 13 𝑥𝑣�𝑚. 
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Levels of expected effort are influenced by both incentive and selection effects. Greater party 
polarization (𝑥2) induces more effort. The second term is the selection effect (−[2
3
𝑥𝑣�𝑚]2). A 
combination of electoral dominance and party polarization leads to a lower level of expected 
effort. With balanced elections, polarization has a ‘pure’ incentive effect where polarization 
causes higher effort levels. With sufficiently unbalanced elections, polarization can also lead 
to a lower level of expected effort. These propositions are analyzed in the ensuing empirical 
analysis.6 
The current empirical setting is sub-national units with a multiparty system (see section 3). 
This calls for two qualifications. First, accountability is the weak point of multiparty systems 
(Bingham Powell 2000, chapter 10). One reason is shifting coalitions. Even in situations when 
one coalition is punished by the voters, coalition partners may remain in office as members of 
a new alliance. This could dilute voters’ ability to select the competent incumbents (Ferejohn 
1986). Another reason is lack of transparency. It can be hard for voters to identify which party 
or parties are responsible for performance (see Nannestad and Paldam 1994:238; Anderson 
2000; Persson and Tabellini 2005: chapter 7). On the other hand, with a plethora of political 
parties, voters can choose between ideologically close parties.7 Therefore ideological 
polarization is less likely to prevent voters from replacing an underperforming incumbent 
with the challenger.  
                                                          
6The probabilistic voting model assumes full commitment, which is problematic in an electoral agency setting. 
As an alternative, the hypothesis can be derived from a model where parties cannot commit to effort levels 
before the election. Like in Ferejohn (1986), a decisive voter sets a reservation utility for reelecting the 
incumbent. The two-period game can be defined in the following way: 1) The median voter declares a 
reservation utility for reelecting the incumbent party. 2) The incumbent party decides an effort level and 
implements his preferred ideological policy. 3) The voter observes the incumbent’s effort and she decides 
whether or not to reelect the incumbent. 4) Whichever party is elected for the second period enacts its preferred 
ideological policies and sets the effort for the second period. The game ends. Both parties and the voter use a 
common discount factor δ < 1. Lopsided elections: In the final period, either party will implement its preferred 
ideological policy, and make a zero effort. Suppose the voter’s position is closer to party A than party B 
(𝑣𝑚 > 0). The voter will always reelect the ideologically ‘closer’ party in the final period. Therefore, neither 
party will exert effort in the first period. Not lopsided elections elections: Consider the case where the voter is 
ideologically indifferent to the parties, that is 𝑣𝑚 = 0. With indifference we assume that the voter can commit to 
reelect the incumbent provided it delivers the reservation utility. Each of the parties will benefit from an effort 
level in the first period if ?̅?𝑃 ≤ 𝛿𝑥2,𝑃 = 𝐴,𝐵. Therefore, higher party polarization (x) increases effort in 
balanced elections, while polarization has no effect in elections where one of the parties has a dominant position 
in the electorate. The model can be elaborated as a game over an infinite time horizon. 
7A related point is relatively low barrier to entry. As compared to majoritarian systems, proportional 
representation may sharpen competition since relatively few votes are required to obtain at least one seat in the 
local assembly. A small contender has a better chance of growing into a serious challenger to the established 
party lists. 
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Second, a highly redistributive grant scheme may weaken accountability. Suppose that citizens 
oversee the performance of local government performance by comparing levels of service output and 
tax costs. High revenue municipalities could provide first-class services despite having low efficiency, 
which would distort citizens’ assessment.  We would therefore expect the agency problem to be of 
greater consequence in high-revenue authorities.  
 
3. The institutional setting 
The institutional setting is a two-tier system comprising a central government, 19 county 
governments and 434 municipalities.8 Norwegian counties and municipalities are responsible 
for implementing national welfare policies, including the provision of nursing services for 
children and elderly, general health care and schools. The local government sector provides a 
number of services including child care, primary and lower secondary education, primary 
health care, and care for the elderly. Local government revenue amounts to about 18 percent 
of GDP, with employment in the local government sector accounting for about 20 percent of 
total employment. The local government revenue is described in section 7. 
The current study uses data on the municipalities. As already indicated, local elections take 
place in the context of a system with a multi-party system based on proportional 
representation with one electoral district per municipality. Local elections are held at fixed 
dates every four years alternating with national elections. The executive board is organized on 
the ‘alderman principle’. This principle implies that the parties gain seats in the executive 
board relative to the number of representatives on the council. Beginning with the local 
elections of 1999, political parties have increasingly opted to enter into mutually binding 
political agreements.9  
 
4. Measuring electoral dominance  
The theoretical framework invoked here is based on the idea that an ideologically lopsided 
electorate can lead to a near-monopoly party power. Therefore, a lopsided electorate is one 
where a dominant share of the electorate persistently supports the socialist or the non-socialist 
                                                          
8We have excluded Oslo, the capital, from the analyses, since it is both a municipality and a county. 
9According to the Polls-Of-Polls organization, nearly all municipalities had an agreement between political 
parties related to the election of the major at the start of the election period. See: 
http://www.pollofpolls.no/?cmd=Kommentarer&do=vis&kommentarid=689  
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party bloc as consequence of their ideological preferences. Electoral dominance should 
therefore not be measured on data for one election period only.10 In principle, a party may win 
a majority of votes by a large margin in one election, and the rival party may win in the next 
by an equally large margin. Although the absolute difference in voter support is considerable 
in both elections, it is not reasonable to describe party competition as low. Likewise, an 
incumbent party (or party bloc) may win the majority in one election with a very narrow 
margin, and the subsequent election with a large margin. Yet it would not be reasonable to 
characterize competition as stiff in the first period, and not in the second. Past voter behavior 
suggests that the incumbent cannot take a reelection for granted, and the party in office is 
likely to act accordingly.  
Electoral dominance has therefore been measured on data for six consecutive local 
elections.11 DOMINANCE has been defined as the share of election periods where either the 
socialist or non-socialist party bloc blocs received more than 60 percent of the votes.12 
Municipalities where local lists accounted for more than 2 percent of the votes were excluded 
from the analysis. We measure DOMINANCE on basis of the six local elections in 1971-1991 
period; the elections in the 1975-1995 period; and the elections in 1979-1999 period. These 
indicators have been matched with data on efficiency for the period 2001-2010. The first 
indicator (based on the elections in 1971-1991) has been matched with efficiency data for 
2001-2003, the second indicator with efficiency data for 2004-2007, and the third with 
efficiency data for 2008-2010. We present descriptive statistics for electoral dominance in 
table 1 below. 
Table 1 here 
Based on statistics on the local elections in the period 1971-1999, the average score on the 
DOMINANCE indicator is well over 0.4. For an average municipality, about 40 percent of the 
elections are dominated by one of the party blocs. About 70 percent of the municipalities 
                                                          
10Existing studies have measured political competition as the absolute difference in voter support between the 
right-wing and left-wing party bloc in each election (Besley and Case 2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos 2009). The 
current conceptualization is slightly different as brings in an enduring predisposition to support one party bloc. 
11This conceptualization implies that estimation with municipality fixed effects is not possible as the 
DOMINANCE indicator is relatively stable. Besley and Case (2003) use annual data on US states for the period 
1950 to 1990, which allows them to include state fixed effects. Svalerud and Vlachos (2009) employ annual data 
on Swedish local government for the period 1974 to 2003, and include municipality fixed effects.   
12 The data on election outcomes, demographic and accountancy data have been provided by the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD is not responsible for the analysis or interpretations presented in this 
paper. 
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experience at least one lopsided election over six consecutive elections. Non-socialist bloc 
dominance is two-three times as frequent as socialist dominance. As expected, lopsided 
election outcomes are a relatively persistent phenomenon. The DOMINANCE-variable is 
skewed to the right: Many municipalities rarely see a lopsided election, while 3 - 6 percent of 
the municipalities have lopsided outcomes in all six elections (not reported in Table 1).  
In Table 1, we show comparable statistics for the 1955, 1959 and 1963 local elections. The 
average DOMINANCE has increased from about 0.3 to 0.42-0.45. This is mostly due to lower 
levels of voter support for the socialist party bloc relative to the non-socialist bloc.  
 
5. Measuring party polarization   
Party polarization describes the ideological distance between two major competitors, which 
means that polarization is conceptually distinct from electoral dominance. This implies that 
party polarization cannot be measured on data on party representation in the legislature 
(Brown et. al. 2011) or by means of population surveys (see Dalton 2008 for a recent review). 
The credibility of political parties requires ideological platforms to be relatively persistent, 
and ideological positions are therefore likely to be quite stable over election periods.  
Party polarization has been measured by means of extensive surveys of a random sample of 
120 Norwegian municipalities. Half the sample of municipalities was drawn as a random 
sample of municipalities with fewer than 5.000 inhabitants, the other half from municipalities 
with more than 5.000 inhabitants. All council members were asked to position themselves on 
the left–right self-positioning scale.13 Data were collected for two local election periods, 
2003–2007 and 2007–2011. We used the common survey question on left–right self-
placement to measure party polarization:  
In politics we often talk about ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ Below is a scale where 0 
represents those who are far left politically, and 10 represents those who are far right 
politically. Where would you place yourself on this scale? Please respond by marking 
your position on the scale from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). 
                                                          
13 The surveys of local council members have been carried out by Statistics Norway on behalf of Lars Chr. 
Monkerud and Rune J. Sørensen at BI Norwegian Business School. The mayors and deputy mayors of the 
remaining municipalities were asked to respond to the same question as well. 
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We rescale the left-right axis to make it vary from -5 (far left) to +5 (far right). The response 
rates in the surveys were over about 60 percent, providing data on nearly 4,500 councilors.14  
We use the average score of the party groups in the local assemblies in both election periods 
as our measure of the party’s ideological position. We apply the conventional classification of 
political parties as socialist (or social-democratic) and non-socialist. On this categorization the 
left-wing party bloc comprises the Labour Party, Socialist Left Party and Red Electoral 
Alliance; the right-wing party bloc comprises the center parties (that is the Center Party, 
Christian People’s Party, the Liberal Party and local party lists), the Conservative Party and 
the Progress Party. Let 𝑋𝐿𝑖 denote the average score on the left–right self-placement index for 
members of party i belonging to the left-wing party bloc (L). Let 𝑠𝐿𝑖 measure party i’s seat 
share within the left-wing bloc. Similarly, let 𝑋𝑅𝑗 and 𝑠𝑅𝑗 denote left-wing scores and seat 
shares within the right-wing party bloc (R). Party polarization (POLARIZATION) is the 
ideological distance between the socialist and non-socialist party blocs. Since 𝑋𝑅𝑗 > 𝑋𝐿𝑖, we 
can define polarization as: 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 = ∑ 𝑋𝑅𝑗 ∙𝑗 𝑠𝑅𝑗 − ∑ 𝑋𝐿𝑖 ∙𝑖 𝑠𝐿𝑖 where ∑𝑠𝑅𝑗 = 1 and ∑𝑠𝐿𝑖 = 1. 
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate party 
polarization. 
Table 2 about here 
In Table 2, we observe that the Labour Party is the dominant player on the socialist side, 
while the sum of the center party seat shares corresponds roughly to the sum of the seat shares 
of the Conservative and the Progress Parties. The representatives of the left-wing parties 
(mostly the Socialist Left Party) and the Progress Party occupy about the same distances from 
the midpoint (centered on the basis of the original left-right scale). We have a maximum 
degree of polarization of about 6.5 points when the local council comprises of these two 
parties only. The Conservative Party is about one point closer to the center than the Progress 
Party, while the Labour Party is much closer to the midpoint than the Socialist Left Party. The 
center parties are relatively close to the political center, but on the non-socialist side. The 
inter-municipal variations in party positions are significant: standard deviations are in the 
                                                          
14The response rate varies between municipalities, from 29% to 80% (2003-2007) and 29% to 82% (2007-2011). 
I correlate the response rate with measured levels of party polarization. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 
r=0.023 (N=120) in the first election period, and r=0.109 (N=120) in the second period. None of the correlations 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Including the response rate as a control variable in the 
regression analysis had little bearing on the results obtained. 
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range 0.62-0.34. The average position of the socialist bloc is -1.76, and the non-socialist bloc 
is 1.56. This gives an average score of party polarization of 3.32 with an (inter-municipal) 
standard deviation of about 1. 
 
6. Measuring service output 
Service output (OUTPUT) has been measured as a composite index covering the major public 
service sectors. The index has been developed by the Advisory Commission on Local 
Government Finances.15 The aggregate output measure is available for the ten-year period 
2001–2010 (see Borge et.al. 2008; Burns and Himmler 2011). For the period 2001-2007, the 
production indicator is based on indicators that cover service production in six service sectors: 
child-care centers, primary and upper secondary education, primary health care, nursing 
services, child custody, and social welfare programs. Output in each of these sectors has been 
measured by several indicators, and the OUTPUT indicator is based on a total of 17 indicators.  
These indicators cover about 70 percent of gross operating costs in the municipality. For the 
period 2008-2010, the index includes the cultural sector and additional quality indicators have 
been developed. The 2008-2010 OUTPUT measure is based on a total of 25 indicators. The 
composite indicator has been defined as follows16 (i: municipality, t: year): OUTPUTit = 𝛼𝑡1𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼𝑡4𝑁𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡5𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡6𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼𝑡7𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡,�𝛼𝑡𝑗
𝑗
= 1 
The weight for each sector has been set according to the sector’s share of aggregate spending, 
and weights have been updated each year. The composite production index (OUTPUT) is 
standardized with a national average of 100 (using municipal population sizes as weights).  
The output measures for the individual sectors have been defined by a key output indicator 
and a set of quality indicators (c.f. Appendix). For example, the key output indicator for 
kindergartens is number of staying hours for children in daycare institutions relative to 
number of children aged 0–5 years. The quality indicators are defined by personnel 
                                                          
15We appreciate the assistance of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development for access to the 
data on production index and the revenue indicator. 
16This refers to the OUTPUT indicator for the 2008-2010 period.  
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qualifications and the area allocated for children’s play and outdoor activities. The output 
measure for kindergartens is the sum of the key output indicator and the quality indicators, 
using weights that add up to one for each of the sectors.  
 
7. Measuring local government revenue  
Municipal revenue comes from three sources, local tax revenue, government grants, and user 
charges. Tax revenue accounts for 41 percent of municipal revenue. Tax revenue is mostly 
collected from a proportional income tax, and tax rates are regulated by central government. 
All municipalities have used the maximum tax-rate since 1977.17  Central government grants 
account for another 47 percent, mostly in the form of a general purpose grant. A large part of 
this block grant is a per capita subsidy designed to equalize revenues across municipalities 
(‘revenue equalization’).  Another component in the general purpose grant scheme 
compensates municipalities for such external factors that influence production costs 
(‘expenditure equalization’). Population size, age structure and settlement pattern are 
important criteria. 
The sum of block grants and tax revenues is called ‘free revenue’. After attending to statutory 
obligations, councils can allocate the ‘free municipal revenue’ to different service sectors as 
they see fit. Local authorities are required by law to maintain a balanced budget and to run an 
operating surplus, first to finance investments and second as a financial buffer.18 The 
municipalities have very little influence on the level of free municipal revenue.  
Adjusted free revenue (REVENUE) is an indicator of the municipality’s purchasing power. It 
makes adjustments in free municipal revenue per capita using the same criteria (cost keys) 
that are included in the system of expenditure equalization described above. The REVENUE 
index is standardized by a national average of 100.19  The adjustment for cost differences does 
                                                          
17 The maximum income tax rates have varied from 12.05 percent to 13.30 percent in the 2001-2010 periods. 
18We include property tax revenue as part of the free revenues. About 300 municipalities levy a tax on properties; 
this revenue accounts for nearly 2 percent of total current revenues. Local property taxes can be levied on land 
and buildings according to specific criteria. The tax rate must be at least 2 but no more than 7 per thousand of the 
taxable property value. When a council decides to levy property tax, 2 per thousand is the maximum rate the first 
year. Before 2007, property taxes could only be levied in urban areas. Outside these areas, property taxes could 
only be levied on industrial plants. From 2007, rural councils were allowed to levy property tax in the whole 
municipality. 
19 Data on adjusted free revenues have been provided by the Ministry of Local Government. The adjustment 
includes the following criteria (for 2005; weights in parentheses): basic criterion (independent of population size; 
0.025), population 0–5 years (0.023), population 6–15 years (0.307), population 16–66 years (0.121), population 
67–79 years (0.085), population 80–89 years (0.133), population 90 years and over (0.049), divorced and 
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not take into account geographical variations in social security contributions. The 
municipalities pay a fixed rate on total wage spending as social security contributions, and the 
rate varies from 14.1 percent in urban areas to zero in the smaller municipalities located in 
peripheral regions. We include here the rate for employers’ contribution to national social 
security as an additional control variable. 
 
8. Measuring efficiency 
Efficiency is defined as the level of production output for a given level of exogenous 
government revenue. Services are provided efficiently when it is impossible to increase output 
with a fixed amount of revenue, and inefficiently when output can be increased with available 
revenues. This is productive efficiency, not allocative efficiency.  We therefore measure 
efficiency by regressing (log) OUTPUT against (log) REVENUE and other control variables.  
Free revenue and adjusted free revenue do not correspond exactly to the costs used to produce 
those services that are covered by the production index (OUTPUT). Local government may 
collect additional revenues. They can do so by charging higher levels of user charges20, by 
running smaller operating surpluses, or by taking large dividends of from government-owned 
companies. The production index does not include administration and infrastructure services, 
and cultural services are not covered in the years 2001-2007. We therefore use the municipal 
accounts to estimate the per capita expenditures (EXPENDITURE) used to provide those 
services covered by the OUPUT index. These spending levels result from political choices, 
and we therefore use the REVENUE indicator as instrument variable when the expenditures 
are used as an alternative measure of available resources. 
Population size could impinge on local government performance. Large municipalities have 
more complex and possibly less transparent organizational patterns, which is likely to increase 
the costs of monitoring performance. We may also observe higher levels of party polarization 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
separated persons 16–59 years (0.038), unemployed 16–59 years ( 0.011), death rate (0.025), non-married 
persons 67 years and over (0.025), share of immigrants (0.005), estimated travel time to center (0.015), distance 
within living zone ( 0.010), distance to the nearest neighboring district (0.011), mentally impaired 16 years and 
over (0.066), mentally impaired under 16 years (0.004), urban settlement (0.042), agricultural employment 
(0.005).  The adjustment does not take into account differences in capital costs and regional variations in the 
social security contributions. 
20Note that the funding of infrastructure services (water supply, sewage, garbage collection and disposal, 
electricity distribution) comes from user charges, and not from ‘free revenue’.  
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and lower frequencies of lopsided elections in populous municipalities.21 We therefore 
include population size (measured on a log-scale) as a control variable.  
Most of the service production targets particular age groups, toddlers, school students and 
senior citizens. To account for potential biases related to different budgetary allocations, we 
include the age groups 0-5, 6-15 and 67 + as additional controls. This corresponds to the 
children who use day-care centers and primary schooling, while the elderly are more likely to 
use health care and nursing services.  
Finally, the municipalities have been classified into 90 economic regions, and we include 
fixed effects for these geographical units (Statistics Norway 2000). This takes out a lot of 
unmeasured variation between municipalities, including variations in voter preferences.  
Table 3 here 
In table 3, we display descriptive statistics for the production indicator and related variables. 
We present data for the entire set of municipalities (about 420 municipalities over the ten-year 
period) and for the subset of the 120 municipalities where survey data is available. The 
stratified sampling of municipalities explains why we observe a higher average population 
size in the subsample where data on party polarization is available than in the total 
municipality population. Otherwise the data on the subsample show that the data are 
comparable to those of the entire municipality population.  
An important concern whether the measured aspects of service production (OUTPUT) 
correlate negatively with service quality. A municipality might achieve a high level of 
measured service production by cutting down on unmeasured aspects of quality. To explore 
the quality hypothesis further, we estimate a regression with the production indicator as 
response variable (log(OUTPUT)) and with controls for the revenue level (log(REVENUE) 
and the controls outlined above (social security rate, demographics, year-region fixed effects). 
The logarithmic form means that the exponential of the estimated residuals is an indicator of 
relative efficiency: Values higher than 1 indicate higher-than-average performance (given 
municipal revenue levels and the other controls), and values lower than 1 suggest lower-than-
average performance. The regression has been estimated with data for the years 2008, 2009 
and 2010.  This efficiency indicator has been combined with survey data that includes 
                                                          
21At the same time, party polarization correlates positively with population size (r=0.30), while electoral 
dominance correlates negatively with population size (r=-0.11).    
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municipality identification, and which measures the residents’ assessment of the service 
quality. We use data from a large survey on user satisfaction with public services from 2010. 
The results have been presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 here 
In Table 4, the municipalities have been classified by levels of efficiency performance. The 
first column displays citizens’ direct evaluation of service quality measured in 2010. The data 
indicate a weak, positive correlation between the efficiency indicator and the assessments. 
The second column shows how the population assesses service quality relative to their 
expectations (also 2010-data). Again we observe a relatively weak and positive correlation 
between measured efficiency and the subjective assessments. This tabulation lends no support 
to the notion that the quantitative performance indicator correlates negatively with subjective 
valuations of service quality.22  
 
9.  Empirical strategy 
A key advantage of the current design is a homogenous institutional environment. All local 
authorities share a similar election system and political institutions, and they face the same 
type of tax constraints and grant system. Another advantage is the centralized control of local 
government revenues in Norway. In the current setting, cost efficiency is unlikely to influence 
government revenue levels (‘soft budget constraints’). Since local governments cannot 
influence the sum of block grants and tax revenues (‘free revenue’), we assume that revenues 
are exogenous. To the extent that reverse causality impinges on the results, we would expect it 
to make it harder to obtain empirical support for the selection model.23   
The main identification problem is due to omitted variable bias, particularly as consequence 
of unmeasured voter preferences. We include a number of controls to eliminate such effects. 
                                                          
22Borge and Haraldsvik (2009) analyze efficiency in the elderly care (c.f. ‘nursing and care in the Appendix). 
Their output indicators are similar, though not identical, to the one employed here. Using survey data, they do 
not find that the more efficient municipalities have lower levels of service quality (Borge and Haraldsvik 2009, 
table 4). 
23First, a highly competent and/or hard-working incumbent that provides services efficiently can be reelected 
despite taking extreme ideological positions. High performance could therefore induce more polarization. A 
reverse causality effect would cause a positive correlation between polarization and efficiency. Second, a 
persistently high incumbency performance (relative to other municipalities) could be the reason why one party 
bloc has been reelected in several periods. We should also expect to see a positive correlation between electoral 
dominance and efficiency. These correlations would go against the selection hypothesis.  
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First, nearly all variations in electoral dominance and party positions are cross-sectional, and 
the estimation therefore does not allow for municipality fixed effects.  We do, however, 
include fixed effects for region-years, which capture regional shocks. Second, the regression 
model comprises a number of time-varying controls, particularly demographic controls.  We 
also include a dummy variable for socialist party majority in the current election period and 
Herfindahl index of party concentration. Party concentration could improves efficiency 
(Borge et. al. 2008), and it also correlates negatively with electoral dominance.  Thirdly, the 
production index comprises more quality indicators and covers a broader range of services 
after 2007. We therefore present regression result based on data for the 2008-2010 period. We 
also control for share of population with higher education. This is potentially relevant as 
education reduce service demands in many sectors, including schooling, health care and social 
welfare. 
Finally, we estimate the impact of electoral dominance, socialist party majority and party 
concentration (the Herfindahl index) with instrument variables. Similar to Svaleryd and 
Vlachos’ (2009:361), we measure electoral dominance on data prior to the large-scale 
restructuring of Norwegian municipalities in the 1960s. Number of municipalities were 
reduced from 744 in 1957 to 454 1967. We use the election statistics from the local elections 
in 1955, 1959 and 1963 to construct instrument variables (cf. Table 1 and 3). The support for 
the individual political parties in the pre-reform municipalities has been aggregated to match 
consolidated structure, and we calculate average electoral dominance, socialist majority and 
party concentration in three pre-reform elections. Since the composition of the electorates and 
the local councils changed as result of the structural reform, we can use pre-reform electoral 
dominance as instruments for electoral dominance in the 1971-1999 periods. 
 
10. Regression results 
We estimate a baseline regression with the production index as response variable, and 
electoral dominance, party polarization and the interaction between polarization and 
dominance as the main explanatory variables. The model includes controls for local 
government revenue, social security contributions, demographics and region-year fixed 
effects.  
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log(𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log (𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐸) + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 ∙ 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,  
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙  
 
Based on the selection hypothesis, we expect both DOMINANCE and POLARIZATION to 
have negative effects on efficiency. The polarization effect is likely to larger with lopsided 
elections (and vice versa), and no effect in situations with balanced competition. This implies 
that  𝛽2 ≤ 0,𝛽3 < 0,𝛽4 < 0. The alternative incentive hypothesis implies that 
POLARIZATION has a positive bearing on efficiency, subject to a low degree of 
DOMINANCE. This implies that  𝛽2 ≤ 0,𝛽3 > 0,𝛽4 < 0. The regression results are 
presented in Table 5.  
Table 5 here 
The two first columns (A1, A2) yield estimates for DOMINANCE only, which allow 
estimation on the entire sample of municipalities. Electoral dominance has a significant in the 
OLS-regression (A1), suggesting that party competition leads to a higher level of service 
output for a given revenue levels. The second column (A2) displays the 2SLS-estimate. Like 
in Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009, table 3), the IV-estimates display a somewhat larger impact. 
A one unit increase in DOMINANCE implies a shift from never having a lopsided electorate 
to having a lopsided electorate in all election periods. According to these regressions, such a 
shift would cause an output reduction of about one percentage point.  
The revenue elasticity is about 0.3, which is similar to previous studies (Borge et.al. 2008, 
table 3; Hauner and Kyobe 2010; Burns and Himmler 2011). Population size has a modest 
negative effect. The population shares of young and elderly also have a negative effect, 
suggesting that service output is lower in municipalities with a high ‘dependency ratio’. 
Neither socialist party majority nor party concentration appears to have much bearing on 
efficiency. 
The ensuing regressions (B1, B2) display regressions for the smaller sample where both 
survey and relevant register data are available. The impact of party polarization is 
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significantly negative. A one unit change in the ten-point left-right scale (about one standard 
deviation in the polarization index, cf. table 3) causes an output reduction of about one 
percentage point.   
That party polarization induces lower levels of cost efficiency lends preliminary support to the 
selection model. In two final column (C1, C2) yield estimates for the baseline model, that is 
we test whether the (negative) impact of electoral dominance is larger in polarized polities. 
Note that polarization and electoral dominance are centered at their mean values. The 
estimated interaction term close to zero in both specifications.  
In Table 6, we estimate regressions for municipalities when we split the sample into high- and 
low revenue municipalities as defined by the average revenue level. Revenues have been 
coded as whole numbers (i.e. percentages), and we allow for a flexible functional form by 
including REVENUE fixed effects. The regressions are similar to those presented in Table 5 
(Table 6, columns i and iii). We may assume that the observed variables provide an indication 
on amount of selection on potential unobserved factors (Altonji et.al 2005). As a robustness 
check, we therefore present regressions with control for revenue and year-region fixed effects 
only (Table 6, columns ii and iv). Since the OLS and 2SLS methods yield comparable 
estimates, we present OLS estimates only.  
 Table 6 here 
The two first columns (i) yield estimates for DOMINANCE based on data for the entire 
sample of municipalities. Persistently lopsided elections generate a substantial and significant 
efficiency loss in the high-revenue municipalities (R≥105), but not in the low-revenue 
municipalities (R<105). In the ensuing columns (ii), all covariates except revenue (fixed 
effects) have been excluded. The estimates are very similar to those obtained in the larger 
model specification. 
We present the baseline model in columns (iii). In the case of high-revenue municipalities, 
POLARIZATION has a negative and significant effect on efficiency. The interaction term is 
also negative and significant, suggesting that polarization has a larger, negative effect when 
dominance is large (and vice versa). Neither electoral dominance nor party bloc polarization 
have substantial or significant effects in low-revenue municipalities. The final pair of 
estimates (iv) are based on regressions where all covariates are excluded as controls. The 
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estimated effects are somewhat larger (in absolute values), but similar to those where the 
time-varying controls were included in the regressions.  
In Figure 1, we display the effects the baseline results for polarization in high-revenue 
municipalities.  
Figure 1 here 
When party competition is stiff (DOMINANCE=0), polarization has no bearing on efficiency. 
In the extreme case of recurrent lopsided elections (DOMINANCE=1), polarization has a 
negative effect of about -0.10. An increase in POLARIZATION of one point on the left-right 
scale (about one standard deviation, c.f. Table 2) would reduce efficiency of about 10 
percentage points. This is consistent with the voter selection model: A polarized party 
structure will not necessarily cause lower government performance. But the combination of 
party polarization and electoral dominance is likely to lead to lower levels of government 
efficiency, particularly in situations where government revenues are lavish. 
Table 7 here 
We present robustness tests in Table 7. In the first specification (I), we substitute the 
DOMINANCE-indicator with separate indicators for socialist- and non-socialist bloc 
dominance. The estimates take similar, negative values in both cases, suggesting that the 
DOMINANCE-estimate is not an artifact of parties’ ideological preferences.24 In the 
following robustness check (II), we redefine DOMINANCE by measuring share of election 
with more than 70 percent of voter support (instead of 60 percent). We also include share of 
population with higher education (III), and estimate the model on data for the 2008-2010 
period better data on OUTPUT is available (IV). All the DOMINANCE estimates are 
negative, and quite similar to those obtained in Table 5. In models V, VI and VII, we estimate 
the baseline model using the smaller dataset with 120 municipalities. We restrict the sample to 
high-revenue municipalities (c.f. Table 6; R≥105). The modifications used are similar to those 
implemented in models II, III and IV above. The estimates are quite similar to those obtained 
in Table 6 (A1, A2). 
 
                                                          
24 The baseline model includes control variables for socialist party majority. The share of representatives from 
each individual political party has also entered as controls in a supplementary robustness test (not presented). 
The results did not change much. 
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11. Conclusions 
Polarization is not necessarily detrimental to government performance. The policy oriented 
incumbent may worry about the prospects of seeing the opponent in office, and he will 
therefore make a greater effort to improve performance when polarization is large. This 
assumes a stiff competitive situation, meaning that the decisive voter is ideologically 
indifferent between the political rivals. The situation is different when the electorate is 
ideologically predisposed in favor of one party or party coalition25. In this situation the 
median voter faces a potential ideological cost if she ousts an underperforming incumbent, 
and these costs will be greater when polarization is large. The combination of party 
polarization and electoral dominance can cause government inefficiency. The empirical 
analysis suggests that electoral polarization and partisan dominance cause lower government 
performance, and these effects appear to reinforce each other. This agency problem has 
greater bearing in high-revenue municipalities.  
Further empirical research may benefit from developing better indicators of government 
performance, including better measures of service quality. It would be valuable have direct 
indicators of the incumbent politicians’ effort levels and competences. Empirical work would 
also benefit from addressing the ‘electoral linkage’ more closely: how actual performance 
impacts on perceived performance, and the extent to which the subjective voter assessment 
influences the behavior of voters and incumbent politicians. In this context, it is relevant to 
test explicitly whether efficiency is a valence issue. For example, local government 
employees may prefer lower levels of efficiency than people working in central government 
and in private sectors. The valence assumption could be analyzed by comparing users and 
non-users prioritization of service quality and volume. Finally, the estimation of causal effects 
can be improved. For example, central government reforms in the local government structure 
may produce exogenous shocks to polarization and dominance, which could be exploited in 
further empirical analyses.  
According to Oates’ decentralization theorem (Oates 1972), decentralization facilitates 
allocation efficiency (under certain assumptions). Polities with homogenous constituencies 
have a greater degree of allocation efficiency, while heterogeneity in voter preferences 
impedes efficiency. The current empirical analysis addresses a different type of efficiency, 
                                                          
25Relevant examples are the political situations in Norway and Sweden in the period of Social Democratic 
hegemony and in Italy in the decades of Christian Democracy dominance. Numerous instances can be found in 
local elections, including the elections to Norwegian local councils. 
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whether service output can be increased for given level of resources (cost efficiency). If 
Oates-type homogeneity leads to a lower degree of party polarization, it could improve cost 
efficiency as well. Yet preference homogeneity might also lead to more lopsided elections. 
For example, small and wealthy suburban local authorities may be completely dominated by a 
right-wing coalition, while other local governments are fully controlled by a left-wing party 
bloc due to their socio-economic structure. Whether decentralization improves or impairs cost 
efficiency depends on how preference homogeneity translates into different patterns of party 
polarization and electoral dominance.  
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Appendix. Documentation of production index  
 
The index is based on six main sectors for each of the years 2001-2007, and seven sectors (including culture) for 
the years 2008-2010. Production output in each of the six (seven) sectors is calculated as a weighted average of a 
number of indexes. These weights are presented in parentheses after each of the indexes. The overall index is a 
weighted average of the six (seven) main service sectors.   
 
Documentation of production index (OUTPUT) 2001-2007  
 
1. Child-care centers (BH) 
• Opening hours in municipal day-care centers relative to number of children 0-5 years (0.854) 
• Number of square meters per outdoor play and children in public kindergartens (0.079) 
• Local transfers to private day care per child 0-5 years (age adjusted) (0.067) 
 
2. Primary education (GS) 
• Teaching hours per year per pupil (0.940) 
• Percentage of population aged 6-9 years with access to after-school scheme (0.030) 
• Percentage of users of municipal after-school scheme with weekly 15 hours or more (0.030) 
 
3. Primary health care (PH) 
• Number of working hours per week by doctors, measured per 10 000 inhabitants (0.406) 
• Number of working hours per week by physical therapists, measured per 10 000 inhabitants (0.406) 
• Number of working hours per week by health nurses, measured per 10 000 inhabitants aged 0-6 years 
(0.188) 
 
4. Nursing services (PO) 
• Percentage of residents over 80 who receive home care services (0.263) 
• Percentage of residents over 80 years with room in institutions (0.237) 
• The proportion of persons in nursing institutions that have separate rooms (0.237) 
• Percentage of users of home care services who receive both practical assistance and nursing services 
(0.263) 
 
5. Child custody (BV) 
• Percentage of children 0-17 years who are included in survey on child custody (0.311) 
• Percentage of children 0-17 years in the child  custody program (0.689) 
 
6. Social welfare (SK) 
• Percentage of population 20-66 years who receive social benefits (0.500) 
• The average benefit payment per month (0.500) 
 
Sector weights in the 2001-2007 index (OUTPUT) 
• Day care: 0.117 
• Primary education: 0.348 
• Primary health care: 0.057 
• Nursing and Care: 0.382 
• Child Custody: 0.033 
• Social welfare: 0.063 
 
 
Documentation of production index (OUTPUT) 2008-2010  
 
1. Child-care centers (BH) 
Adjusted stay hours in public and private kindergartens in relation to the number of children 0-5 years (0.8) 
Number of square meters of playroom and outdoor area per child in kindergartens (0.1) 
Percentage of staff with early childhood education (0.1) 
 
2. Primary education (GS) 
Number of primary school points (based on exam results, adjusted for socio-economic factors) (0.752) 
Learning environment (physical facilities and subjective satisfaction) (0.141) 
Number of PCs per pupil in primary schools (0.047) 
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Percentage of population aged 6-9 years with space in municipal (0.030) 
Percentage of users of municipal after-school scheme (0.030) 
 
3. Primary health care (PH) 
Number of hours per week by doctors in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.413) 
Number of hours per week of physical therapists in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.390) 
Number of hours per week of health nurses in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.197) 
 
4. Nursing and Care (PO) 
Recipients of home care services in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.436) 
Residents in institutions in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.364) 
The proportion of institutional places that are secluded room (0.090) 
Percentage of users of  receiving practical assistance and home nursing (0.110) 
 
5. Child Custody (BV) 
Children covered by the child welfare investigation in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.252) 
Children 0-17 years covered by the measures in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.548) 
Percentage of employees with relevant professional training (0.200) 
 
6. Social welfare (SK) 
Number of recipients of social assistance in relation to the needs adjusted population (0.500) 
The average benefit payment per month (0.500) 
 
7. Culture (KUL) 
Books in libraries per capita (0.2665) 
Lending of books per capita (0.2665) 
The number of cinema seats per capita (0.055) 
Visit the cinema per capita (0.055) 
Support to activities for children and kids 6-16 years per capita (0.357) 
 
Sector weights in the 2008-2010 index (OUTPUT) 
Kindergarten 0.144 
Primary education 0.310 
Primary health care 0.052 
Nursing and Care 0.361 
Child Welfare 0.032 
Social services 0.058 
Culture 0.043 
Source: Rapport fra Det tekniske beregningsutvalget for kommunal og fylkeskommunal økonomi (TBU), april 
2009, kapittel 3. 
 
 
Table 1. Electoral dominance. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Election
periods: % one period Mean % one period Mean % one period Mean_______________________________________________________________________________________
Election in the years 21,4 % 0,175 21,1 % 0,123 42,8 % 0,299
1955,1959 and 1963 (0.36) (0.26) (0.39)
Election in the period 20,4 % 0,112 47,8 % 0,303 68,2 % 0,415
1971-1991 (0.27) (0.38) (0.39)
Election in the period 18,2 % 0,095 52,5 % 0,334 70,4 % 0,429
1975-1995 (0.24) (0.39) (0.39)
Election in the period 17,7 % 0,081 55,9 % 0,363 73,2 % 0,444
1979-1999 (0.21) (0.40) (0.38)_______________________________________________________________________________________
Mean: Average score on the DOMINANCE indicator, i.e. average share of election periods where one of 
the party blocs have at lest 60 percent voter support . (Standard deviations in parentheses).
% one period: Percent of municipalities with more than 60 percent party bloc support 
in at least  one election period. 
Socialist bloc Non-socialist bloc DOMINANCE
Table 2. Party polarization. 
_________________________________________________________________
Political party Left-right score Seat share
The left-wing parties Mean -3,09 0,08
(Std.err.) (0.49) -
Std.dev. 0,53 0,06
The Labour Party Mean -1,44 0,31
(Std.err.) (0.43) -
Std.dev. (0.56  ) 0,12_________________________________________________________________
The center parties Mean 0,11 0,31
(Std.err.) (0.42) -
Std.dev. 0,62 0,17
The Conservative Party Mean 2,59 0,16
(Std.err.) (0.35) -
Std.dev. 0,34 0,09
The Progress Party Mean 3,44 0,14
(Std.err.) (0.48) -
Std.dev. 0,51 0,10_________________________________________________________________
Non-Socialist party bloc Mean 1,56
position Std.dev. 0,76
Socialist party bloc Mean -1,76
position Std.dev. 0,56_________________________________________________________________
Party polarization Mean 3,32
Std.dev. 1,02_________________________________________________________________
Left-right score yields the average left-right positions of local council members in political
parties and party groups. Party polarization has been measured as the difference in
left-right score beteen the non-socialist and socialist party bloc.
The left-wing parties comprises the Red Electoral Alliance and the
the Socialist Left Party. The center parties comprises the Liberal Party, 
the Christian People's Party, the Center Party and a few local lists and other parties. 
Number of respondents: 2266 (2011) and 2125 (2007). Number of municipalities: 120.
Source: Survey to local council members in 2007 and 2011.
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Table 3. Descriptive statisics 2001-2010
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Average Std. Dev. (N) Average Std. Dev. (N)_______________________________________________________________________________________
Production index (OUTPUT) 108,6 15,1 (3710) 103,1 12,6 (1078)
Revenue index (REVENUE) 105,8 21,7 (3710) 100,0 12,2 (1078)
Per capita costs (EXPENDITURES) 48,0 14,0 (4288) 43,9 10,4 (1190)
Rate of social security contributions 11,1 4,2 (3944) 12,1 3,7 (1091)
Population size 9558 18541 (4286) 16892 30119 (1193)
Share aged 0-5 years 0,08 0,01 (4286) 0,09 0,01 (1193)
Share aged 6-15 years 0,12 0,01 (4286) 0,12 0,01 (1193)
Share aged 67 years or more 0,14 0,03 (4286) 0,13 0,03 (1193)
Share with higher education 0,17 0,05 (4317) 0,18 0,05 (1193)
Socialist majority (=1) 0,17 0,38 (4393) 0,18 0,39 (1193)
Party consentration (Herfindahl ind.) 0,25 0,11 (4273) 0,23 0,07 (1193)
Electoral dominance (DOMINANCE) 0,43 0,39 (4050) 0,37 0,38 (1193)
Party polarization (POLARIZATION) 3,30 1,02 (1193)_______________________________________________________________________________________
Instrument.: Socialist majority (=1) 0,09 0,22 (4340) 0,09 0,22 (1193)
Instrument: Party consentration 0,36 0,14 (4340) 0,34 0,12 (1193)
Instrument:  Electoral dominance 0,30 0,39 (4340) 0,27 0,38 (1193)_______________________________________________________________________________________
The revenue index is the sum of taxes on income and assets plus bloc grants. The index has been
adjusted by the criteria in the grant system. This includes population, age structure, settlement
pattern and various social indicators. The adjusted revenue index (REVENUE) has been calculated
as the revenue index less municipal social security contributions.
Per capita costs (EXPENDITURES) cover those spending items that are included in the production
index (OUTPUT), and has been taken from the municipal accounts.
Share with higher education is the share of population aged 15 years or more with higher
education, that is people with a tertiary degree  from a university or college.
Instruments: The instrument variables for socialist majority, party concentration and electoral dominance 
has been calculated on basis of the years 1955, 1959 and 1963.
Entire sample Subsample with data on
party polarization
Table 4. Efficiency and quality assessment
(Standard errors in parentheses.)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Estimated
relative Service Service quality Number of Average Average Number of
efficiency quality relative respondents relative population municipalities
to expectations in the survey efficiency size___________________________________________________________________________________________________
0.964 0.795
(0.044) (0.049)
1.048 0.890
(0.034) (0.037)
1.035 0.872
(0.025) (0.027)
1.036 0.834
(0.019) (0.021)
1.080 0.893
(0.023) (0.025)
1.053 0.880
(0.030) (0.032)___________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Estimated relatiave efficiency:
The efficiency score has been estimated by means of a regression model with log(OUTPUT) as response variable, 
and with controls for adjusted municipal revenue (log), population size (log), share of population in the age groups
 0-5 years, 6-15 year and 67 years or more, share of population with higher education, and fixed effects for 
economic regions (N=90). The efficiency index has been defined as residual OUTPUT (i.e. exp(residual OUTPUT)).  
The 2010 user survey:
Data on service quality has been taken from a large population survey (2010) conducted by the Norwegian Agency 
for Public Management and eGovernment (Difi). 
Detailed documentation of the survey data has been posted on DiFi's webpage: 
http://www.difi.no/artikkel/2010/11/innbyggerundersokelsen-de-ansatte-er-viktigst-for-tilfredsheten-med-det-offentlige
The averages have been estimated using the survey weight supplied by the data provider.
Service quality : "Considering these services (specified above), to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the service quality?'
Service quality relative to expectations :'To what extent does the service quality of these services meet your expectations?'
For each of the two general questions, the respondents indicated levels of satisfaction on a scale from -3 (very dissatisfied) 
to +3 (very satisfied). The 2010 survey data have been combined with efficiency scores from 2008, 2009 and 2010.
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Table 5. Regression estimates for efficiency. 2001-2010. 
(Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
REVENUE (log) 0,261 *** 0,393 *** 0,411
(0.0099) (0.028) (0.030)
EXPENDITURES (log) 0,365 *** 0,421 ** 0,479 ***
(0.046) (0.141) (0.086)
RATE (Social secur. contr.) -0,002 *** 0,000 -0,003 -0,003 -0,004 -0,002
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
DOMINANCE -0,009 * -0,014 -0,015 * -0,003
(0.004) (0.020) (0.007) (0.015)
POLARIZATION -0,009 ** -0,015 * -0,010 ** -0,012 *
(0.0029) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
POLARIZATION*DOMINANCE 0,000 0,001
(0.006) 0,011
Population size (log) -0,039 *** -0,048 -0,024 *** -0,020 -0,023 *** 0,000
(0.0017) (0.065) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008)
Share 0-5 year -1,281 *** 1,613 *** -0,896 ** 3,863 * -0,862 * 3,805 ***
(0.189) (0.296) (0.333) (1.771) (0.362) (0.934)
Share 6-15 year -1,014 *** -1,026 -1,926 *** -0,357 -1,863 *** -0,505
(0.159) '(0.686) (0.259) (0.756) (0.267) (0.585)
Share 67 years - 0,095 0,464 ** 0,286 1,210 ** 0,269 1,389 ***
(0.079) (0.149) (0.151) (0.366) (0.159) (0.299)
Socialist majority -0,006 0,179 0,002 0,140 * 0,002 1,389
(0.004) (0.376) (0.006) (0.067) (0.006) (0.012)
Herfindahl index of 0,034 -0,566 -0,170 ** -1,132 -0,204 ** -0,458 ***
party consentration (0.0214) (2.247) (0.062) (1.100) (0.069) (0.128)____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Estimation method OLS 2SLSa,b) OLS 2SLSb) OLS 2SLSc)
Fixed effect for region*year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Number of municipalities) (379) (379) (116) (116) (116) (116)
(Number of economic regions) (90) (90) (65) (65) (65) (65)
(Number of observations) (3271) (3271) (1011) (1011) (1011) (1011)____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*:p<0.05;  **:p<0.01;  ***:p<0.001
a) Table A1 provides the reduced form and first stage regression results. 
b) The 2SLS estimations in A2 and B2 employs instruments for expenditures, electoral  dominance, socialist  majority 
and party consentration.
c) The 2SLS estimation  in C2 use log(REVENUE) for log(EXPENDITURES) only.
The variables DOMINANCE and POLARIZATION have been centered at the sample  means.
A1 B1 B2 C2A2 C1
Table 6. Regression estimates for high- and low revenue municipalities. 
(Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R≥105 R<105 R≥105 R<105 R≥105 R<105 R≥105 R<105_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DOMINANCE -0,037 *** -0,006 -0,045 *** 0,001 0,122 * 0,004 -0,080 -0,015
(0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.053) (0.010) (0.054) (0.010)
POLARIZATION -0,034 * -0,008 -0,064 *** -0,018 ***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
POLARIZATION*DOMINANCE -0,112 ** -0,002 -0,085 *** 0,001
(0.035) (0.008) (0.021) (0.008)_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Fixed effect for region*year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effect for REVENUE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
(Number of municipalities) (183) (289) (183) (289) (37) (84) (37) (84)
(Number of economic regions) (62) (83) (62) (83) (46) (53) (46) (53)
(Number of observations) (1048) (2239) (1048) (2239) (194) (762) (194) (762)_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*:p<0.05;  **:p<0.01;  ***:p<0.001
R≥105: Revenue level greater than the average level; R<105: Revenue level smaller than the average level.
Fixed effect for REVENUE: The revenue index has been coded in whole numbers, and included as fixed effects in the regression model.
Time-varying controls: Population size (log), age structure (share 0-5 years, 6-15 years and 67- years), 
party concentration,  (Herfindahl index), and socialist majority (=1). 
Party polarization and electoral bias have been centered at the sample means.
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Figure 1. The efficiency impact of  party polarization 
The predicted values and confidence intervals are based on table 6 (iii, R≥105). 
Estimated effect
95% c. i.
95% c. i.
Table 7. Roboustness checks. Estimates for party polarization and electoral bias only.
(Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses).
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Estimates Model specification______________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________
DOMINANCE Non-socialist Socialist POLARIZATION
DOMINANCE DOMINANCE___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I -0.021** -0.0047 Not included Like A1 in table 5, but separate effects
(0.007) (0.0043) for socialist/non-socialist dominance___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
II -0.016** Not included Like A1 in table 5, but DOMINANCE has been redefined as 
(0.0051) share of years where one party bloc had 70 percent or more of the votes
III -0.009* Not included Like A1 in table 5, but the model includes share of population
(0.0037) aged 15 years or more with higher education
IV -0.010 Not included Like A1 in table 5, but estimated on basis for the 
(0.0071) years 2008-2010.___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Estimates Model specification______________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________
DOMINANCE POLARIZATION POLARIZATION*DOMINANCE___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
V -0.131*** -0.121 Like iii (R≥105) in table 6, but DOMINANCE has been redefined as 
(0.036) (0.081) share of years where one party bloc had 70 percent or more of the votes
VI -0.128*** -0.099* Like iii (R≥105) in table 6; with control for share of population
(0.029) (0.049) aged 15 years or more with higher education
VII 0,0513 -0.217** Like iii (R≥105) in table 6; estimated on basis of the 
(0.082) (0.081) years 2008-2010.___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*:p<0.05;  **:p<0.01;  ***:p<0.001
Party polarization and electoral bias have been centered at the sample means.
(0.0396)
-0,001
-0,0358
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.016)
Table A1. First stage regression results for 2SLS (table 5, A2)
(T-values in parentheses.)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Electoral Socialist Party concentration Expenditures
majority (Herfindahl index) (log)___________________________________________________________________________________________________
REVENUE (instrument) -0,020 0,235 **** 0,049 *** 0,646 ***
(0.47) (4.35) (5.68) (25.80)
DOMINANCE  (Instrument) 0,391 *** 0,235 *** 0,012 *** -0,029 ***
(26.98) (4.96) (4.14) (3.31)
Socialist majority (Instrument) -0,290 *** 0,198 *** 0,032 *** -0,053 ***
(12.03) (6.36) (6.37) (3.35)
Herfindahl index (instrument) 0,030 0,185 *** 0,037 *** -0,089 ***
(0.68) (3.25) (4.02) (3.36)___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Fixed effects for region*years Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test for excluded instruments 727,9 40,4 16,2 665,6___________________________________________________________________________________________________
*:p<0.05;  **:p<0.01;  ***:p<0.001
Selected first stage estimates
DOMINANCE
